

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**GIVE DETERRENCE A CHANCE:
A STRATEGY AGAINST AL QAEDA**

by

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Report Documentation Page			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188		
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 30 MAR 2007		2. REPORT TYPE Strategy Research Project		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2006 to 00-00-2007	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Give Deterrence a Chance A Strategy Against Al Qaeda				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Lyle Hoag				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT See attached.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 27	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Commander Lyle Hoag
TITLE: Give Deterrence a Chance: A Strategy Against Al Qaeda.
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 28 March 2007 WORD COUNT: 7,814 PAGES: 27
KEY TERMS: Terrorism, Motivation, Systems
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Engaged in a global war on terrorism, America is fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan to rid the world of Al Qaeda, other apocalyptic terrorists, and the regimes that harbor them. In the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the president has laid out a strategy to defeat these terrorists. While deterrence is contained in the strategy, it is apparent from the application of the strategy that deterrence has not been used or that its use is effective. In application, the strategy has been heavy on defeat and light on deter. It relies on the military, but does little to weave all other aspects of national power to help solve the problem of terrorism. Deterrence has many short comings as a strategy in application against terrorism but these problems can be overcome. This paper will discuss deterrence and terrorism and provide a strategic framework for its use.

GIVE DETERRENCE A CHANCE: A STRATEGY AGAINST AL QAEDA

From the beginning, the War on Terror has been both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas — a fight against the terrorists and their murderous ideology. In the short run, the fight involves the application of all instruments of national power an influence to kill or capture the terrorists; deny them safe haven and control of any nation; prevent them from gaining access to WMD [weapons of mass destruction]; render potential terrorist target less attractive by strengthening security; and cut off their sources of funding and other resources they need to operate and survive. In the long run, winning the War on Terror means winning the battle of ideas. Ideas can transform the embittered and disillusioned either into murderers willing to kill innocents, or into free people living harmoniously in a diverse society.

—National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,
September 2006

Deterrence can be part of an overall strategy for combating terrorism. In practice, the United States has placed considerable emphasis in the defeating terrorists (militarily) in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and less on deterrence (defend and denial). The above passage from the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism shows have both defeat and deter strategies. We kill or capture terrorists (defeat), deny them the safe haven of rogue states (denial), dry up the funds that let them operate as an organization (defeat and deny) and render targets less attractive (defend). While military action in the GWOT is indispensable, it the argument of this paper that deterrence can support and strengthen strategies used against terrorism. While it is true that the administration has never entirely deserted deterrence strategies as the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism specifically lists deterrence and administration officials have attempted to bolster the reputation of the US to aid deterrence¹ but aspects of deterrence are overlooked that could make the strategy more robust.

The critique of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is not that it does not articulate a vision to defeat terrorism but that this lofty vision does not have the associated ways and means to accomplish this end. The grandiose end of advancing "...freedom and human dignity through effective democracy..."² is not balanced by any commensurate way nor does it offer any realistic means (resources) to accomplish this end. Robert H. Dorff's criticism of the National Security Strategy of the United States in that it does not set priorities or choose between competing objectives is an apt criticism of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. As he correctly stated, "Grand aspirations and grand strategy are hardly one and the same."³ This paper will review the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism with regard to the application of deterrence.

Deterrence Theory, Definitions and Context

Before laying out this deterrence framework, it is important to review and understand some basic definitions and concepts of deterrence. Webster's dictionary defines the term deter as 'to turn aside, discourage, or prevent from acting by fear of consideration of dangerous, difficult, unpleasant attendant circumstances or consequences'. This definition brings to light two basic principles of deterrence. The first is that a threat is given and understood. The second is that the threat causes an event not to happen. The threat must be received, understood, evaluated as credible, costs weighed against the potential benefits, and then the decision made not to proceed. Failure in any one of these areas can cause a failure of deterrence. If deterrence succeeds the difficulty arises in attempting to link the lack of action to the deterrent effect. As Colin Gray succinctly describes this phenomenon "...episodes of successful deterrence are recorded as blanks in the pages of history books."⁴ In other words, attack does not occur, so there is nothing for history to record.

Deterrence Categories

In Lawrence Freedman's definitive book, *Deterrence*, the author classifies the types of deterrence in four pairs: narrow and broad, extended and central, denial and punishment, and immediate and general.⁵ Narrow deterrence attempts to avert a specific act. An example of narrow deterrence would be deterring a terrorist from using a specific weapon, such as WMD or from attacking a certain building. Broad deterrence seeks to dissuade all forms of warfare or violence.⁶ The second pair, extended or central, defines who is getting the protection of the deterrence envelope. Central deterrence is self protection whereas extended deterrence is protection of allies. Extended deterrence can be more problematic because it might involve going to war to protect an ally when there might be no other vital interest involved.⁷ Also defense at home may make an attack on our allies more likely.

The third pair, denial and punishment, illustrate the type of control a state seeks on the deterred. For punishment, deterrence is established by the threat of retaliation. The opponent may elect to attack and the attack might be successful but the retribution of the counterattack will cost more than the potential benefit of the attack. Denial on the other hand attempts to deter by making the attack unlikely to succeed. By defense or overwhelming ability to manage consequences of the attack, denial would lead the aggressor to choose not to attack because of the inability to achieve the aims of the belligerent.⁸ The last pairing of deterrent categories is immediate and general. Patrick Morgan formulated the difference of these two aspects of deterrence. The differences between the two depend on the element of time. Immediate

deterrence concerns deterring a crisis that is eminent while general deterrence involves the overall capability to deter a theoretical attack in the future.⁹

What types of deterrence will work against terrorists? Of the first pair, a narrow and broad, both narrow and broad have their uses. Narrow deterrence is more likely to be successful to prevent terrorists' specific acts. If a terrorist target is known, defenses can be strengthened to make the target less palatable or the terrorists themselves could be threatened. A broad deterrence strategy can work against a part of the terrorist system, for example the financial backers of the terrorist system, to deter the action of the group as a whole. Of the second pair, extended or central, an extended deterrent policy should be sought. The GWOT must be a global fight to be effective especially against a transnational entity like al Qaeda. The deterrent envelope must extend over our allies and friends. Though it should be a goal to minimize terrorist attacks on the US, our allies must also be protected. The terrorist attacks in Spain and the subsequent loss of support by our Spanish allies emphasize the need for an extended deterrent strategy. By treating attacks on our allies as attacks on the US, we accomplish two things: allegiances are strengthened and our international legitimacy will be increased. To prosecute the GWOT, allies will be needed to maintain global pressure on terrorist networks.

Of the third pair, denial and punishment, a strategy that includes both techniques is desirable. A buildup of defensive capabilities combined with consequence management should an attack happen is only prudent. If deterrence fails and an attack happens, it should be clear that the state will take positive action to punish the offenders because "...if a transgression goes unpunished then there is no deterrence."¹⁰ When denial fails, punishment will reign. Of the last category pair, general and immediate, both types should be employed depending on the situation. General deterrents might be sent to supportive heads of state whereas an immediate deterrent could be warning the terrorist about to commit an act that their plans are compromised and the nation's intent to interdict or punish the organization if they continue.

Factors Effecting Deterrence: Reputation, Legitimacy, and Norms

Credibility is a main component of a deterrence strategy. Two factors play large roles in credibility are capability and will. First, an opponent must understand that a state possesses the ability to carry out its threat. Second, the opponent must understand that the state has the political will to "pull the trigger".¹¹ Of the two, capability is the easiest to determine. It can be quantified by the strength and size of a military force. Though misunderstanding an adversaries capabilities can lead to deterrence failure, it is much more likely that a mistake will be made with

regards to assessing the opponents will. Will is somewhat nebulous factor and is distinctly qualitative and subjective. An opponent's reputation in exercising military options in the past is a way that opponents can judge your will for future engagements.

Deterrence is a choice that is made in the mind of the opponent. The opponent weighs the benefits of an attack against the possibility and damage of a response and from this makes a decision whether to be deterred or not.¹² The reputation of the coercive state is essential. If your reputation is such that the opponent believes that you will not react to the attack or that the reaction will be minimal and ineffective the adversary is less likely to be deterred. Paul Davis and Brian Jenkins judge that our actions prior to 9/11 caused a "profound failure of deterrence."¹³ David B. Rivkin Jr. contributing editor to the *National Review* magazine noted that Osama bin Laden viewed the United States as a "weak horse:"

This disdain for American's staying power is not particularly surprising. Several decades worth of American retreats under fire in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia; our failure to respond, except through ineffectual law enforcement methods, to Hezbollah and al Qaeda attacks on American assets in the 1990s; and our seeming toleration of the kidnapping and torture of American personnel in the Middle East have all fostered the impression that, in Osama bin Laden's own words, American is a "weak horse." Properly erasing this impression has become a paramount U.S. policy priority, critical to reclaiming a credible deterrence posture.¹⁴

The past affects the reputation of a state and consequently the ability to have effective deterrence in the future. This might cause the need to retaliate to maintain the reputation to a vital interest because "...when prudence and caution might argue for avoiding a confrontation or not enforcing a demand, thought must be given to the implications of this for crises to come."¹⁵ A reputation that shows strength and resolve is crucial for effective deterrence.

Another factor that increases the credibility of deterrence is international legitimacy. When threats are determined to be legitimate by the international community, they carry more weight because of the increased likelihood that they might be carried out. Therefore a United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) when backed by a competent military force such as the US effectively relays the message to a transgressing nation and acts as a deterrent. For example, the US failure to get a second UNSCR in the second Gulf War probably may have convinced Saddam Hussein that an attack was unlikely. Legitimacy therefore has the effect of raising the will of the deterring state.

Societal norms also play a large role in increasing will and supporting deterrence. If the opponent can be shown to violate societal norms, the state's case for applying coercive tactics can be strengthened.¹⁶ This is particularly important when deterring terrorism. If it can be

shown that the terrorists are violating cultural or religious rules, it is possible that they "...and those that support them [will] become stigmatized by the wider community as deviants."¹⁷ This ability to separate the terrorists from their support base is an important subject and will be discussed in a later section.

The Advantages of a Deterrence Strategy

When compared against the strategy of pre-emption, deterrence has two major advantages: economy and legitimacy. Deterrence can be significantly cheaper than pre-emption or denial. This argument may raise the hackles of many military pundits who advocate that effectiveness not efficiency is needed in war. While these arguments are sound against conventional opponents, the GWOT requires both. The GWOT as the next cold war will probably last as long if not longer than its predecessor and will require economy of forces. Also consider the almost limitless number of terrorist targets in the United States. The cost of defending those potential targets would be prohibitive. Increased defense in one area (e.g. airports) could potentially make attacks more probable in the next area (e.g. shopping malls). The cost of pre-emption has also been high. Though the estimates on what the costs for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are varied, it is projected that by the end of 2008 over \$700 billion dollars will have been spent.¹⁸ This does not include the cost of lives and potential cost to our reputation. Deterrence on the other hand is relatively cheap.

Deterrence can also add to legitimacy because it demonstrates restraint. The pre-emption strategy has caused significant tension both domestically and with our allies and friends. Henry Kissinger describes the problem of preemption as "implemented by a power with the overwhelming military preponderance of the United States, the doctrine prompts claims of hegemony of some on the American side and increasing resistance by others, particularly members of traditional alliances."¹⁹ Although pre-emption has its place in a strategy, it has caused considerable strain on traditional alliances that in turn might hurt efforts to combat terrorism.

Al Qaeda

Terrorists have been described as sociopaths, narcissists, fanatics, extremists, zealots, true-believers, jihadists or demented criminals. If terrorists are sociopaths or other deviants (and it is probable that some are), then it is unlikely that deterrence with its reliance on rational cost benefit calculations will provide an effective strategy. A fundamental objective of a strategist is to understand the enemy. This is especially relevant in developing a deterrent strategy because the ultimate decision on the success of deterrence is up to the adversary. A

deterrence strategy cannot be based on its “elegance and persuasiveness to us” but on its ability to persuade the adversary.²⁰ To understand if deterrence can be an effective tool used against terrorists, it is critical to understand the worldview of the terrorist and the culture that they inhabit.

The Central Intelligence Agency defines terrorism per Title 22 of the US Code, Section 2656f(d) as “...premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience”.²¹ The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism describes terrorists as having a “...distorted and violent view of the world.”²² The various definitions of terrorism generally converge on five points. First, terrorism involves the use of violence. It is perpetrated by groups or individuals. Its targets are civilians. The purpose of the violence is to instill fear. This fear is meant to change a political position.²³ Terrorism is a coercive strategy like deterrence meant to achieve a purpose. “When people watch what they say and do because they do not want to attract the attention of terrorists, that is a form of deterrence at work.”²⁴ To create a more effective deterrence strategy against a terrorist organization, it is important to understand the root causes and motivations behind the transnational terrorist movement.

Causes of Terrorism

These following sections are not meant to justify or excuse terrorism. Nor is it meant to provide a laundry list of demands that could be met to end terrorism. Appeasement of the terrorists’ demands would in general lead to more demands and subsequently more terrorism. But by understanding some of the causes of terrorism and attempting to fix the problems that affect the society in general could alleviate some of the conflict and remove support for the terrorist cause. Secondly, understanding your enemy’s motivations can help predict his actions, which in turn, help defeat and deterrence strategies. The purpose, although difficult, is to develop “...a more differentiated understanding of the opponent’s values, ideology, culture, and mind-set.”²⁵ This is not to say that this knowledge guarantees success only that without this knowledge, the strategies are likely to fail.²⁶

It is difficult to point to a specific cause for terrorism. Potential explanations for terrorism range from simple criminality to victimization to religious confrontation or the clash of civilizations. John Keegan summarizes the general Western puzzlement toward terrorists, their tactics and goals:

What baffles Westerners is why Muslim militants hate Western civilization as bitterly as they do. There is, perhaps, no logical explanation; most modern Westerners would fail to supply a persuasive explanation of the hatred felt

between their Protestant and Catholic ancestors in the century of the Reformation. The hatred felt by Muslim extremist is, however, real and it has historic roots.²⁷

It is simple to vilify terrorists and their tactics but it must be remembered that their dissatisfaction may have a real basis that resonates with the general population. Without an understanding of the problems and an attempt to remedy these problems, terrorists may be destroyed and defeated "...but we cannot stop terrorism, because the roots are deep and complex."²⁸

Another important distinction is the type of terrorism with which we are at war. Bruce Hoffman, a Rand Corporation's expert on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, divides terrorists into two groups: secular and religious. These two groups have distinctly different motivations and behavior. The former is motivated by political or national aims whereas the latter is motivated by religious imperative. Although the latter group also has political aims, the real difference in these two groups is how they perpetrate violence. Secular terrorist "...consider indiscriminate violence as immoral and counterproductive."²⁹ Whereas, in religious terrorism, violence "...assumes a transcendent purpose..." which cause the "...loosening of the constraints on the commission of mass murder."³⁰ Clearly, al Qaeda is in the latter group.

To understand some of the causes of terrorism in the Muslim world, it is important to understand the history and culture of the region. Historically the Ottoman Empire was once the model of civilizations and the source of advances in both science and art. It spanned from India to Spain. But its collapse was blamed not on internal problems of the empire but on interference by Western colonial powers.³¹ These "...collective memories of humiliation and defeat, become magnified with a culture that values and prizes the past."³² Yet another grinding force on the Muslim society is globalization. Globalization is in conflict with their society both economically and culturally. Organizations fostering the economic globalization such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization are seen by many to favor policies that enrich wealthy countries at the expense of poor ones.³³ These organizations "create new breeding grounds for terrorism by leaving people behind. Because of globalization, a new class of poor and disinherited people is created."³⁴ On the cultural battlefield, globalization is the Westernization of the Arab culture. Benjamin Barber in *Jihad vs. McWorld* argues the conflict between fundamentalism and modernity is at the heart of conflict and that in this battlefield the "superior corrosiveness of knowledge over arms and of communication over armies..."³⁵ would mean that "McWorld" could succeed where armies had failed. Even as they resist the effects of globalization on their culture, they also understand the potential monetary advantages and political freedoms that the forces of globalization can render and come to be

envious of this even while they resent it. This cultural battlefield, in which the Islamists feel that they are the victims vice terrorists, justifies their use of violence and "...that the final aim justifies the means."³⁶

Anthony J. Marsella lists six conditions that encourage terrorism: global poverty, racism, oppression, Israel, unstable nations, and rogue nations.³⁷ Each condition should be examined. Poverty is not a determining factor for terrorism. In fact, many terrorists and their supporters are wealthy. Poverty is a contributing factor. When a person believes that this life contains nothing for him, he is more likely to risk or give his life for terrorism. Racism contributes to terrorism because many Arab and Muslims see the US support to Israel as a racist policy. In their eyes, this support is founded on the basis of race. Oppression of minorities is another condition that fosters terrorism. The phrase that 'One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter' captures this quite well. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to be a hotbed of terrorist's activities in the Middle East. Unstable nations like Afghanistan and Somalia are a breeding ground for terrorists. These failed and failing nations' inability to control their borders and provide basic services to their citizenry contributes to the rising level of terrorist activities. Lastly, transnational terrorism is greatly enhanced by the assistance of rogue nations. These nations provide safe havens, training bases, weapons, and financial support to terrorist organizations.³⁸ While this listing of conditions that enable terrorism is not all inclusive, it provides a starting point in which a comprehensive strategy that includes inducements can be formulated. Inducements that foster economic growth or reduce oppression will help establish conditions that will reduce terrorism.

The root causes and enabling conditions are secular and have solutions though difficult. The religiously motivated terrorist sees the application of terrorism as "...a sacramental act or divine duty executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative."³⁹ Noted expert on terrorism, Walter Laqueur, describe these terrorists as having an "...absolute certainty as to the justness of their cause, the legitimacy of their leader, the inability to recognize other moral values and considerations, and the abdication of critical judgment."⁴⁰ It should be noted that even these terrorists point to secular reasons to justify their tactics. Though it might be true that for this type of terrorist deterrence may not provide much in the way of solutions, it is possible that deterrence may be effective against an organization of terrorists.

Al Qaeda Structure

Al Qaeda is a transnational Sunni Islamic terrorist organization that operates in over 60 countries. Its total membership is unknown but it is believed that the organization has a core of

approximately 500 to 1000 persons. This group is led by Osama Bin Laden, who although being the titular head of the organization, is more important "...as a spokesman and revolutionary icon than an operational commander."⁴¹ That operational commander is most likely, his confidant and doctor, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Al Qaeda was born during the Soviet Union War in Afghanistan and these men "...shared a powerful life experience, a more global view, and a heady sense of confidence underscored by the Soviet Union's ultimate withdrawal and subsequent collapse, for which they assumed credit."⁴²

The leadership of the organization has a seamless hierarchy for replacement. The organization's leadership has been significantly degraded since 9/11 and over three quarters of the then known leaders have been captured or killed.⁴³ Even after these continued attacks over the last five years, its global network continues to operate which is a testimony to its design.⁴⁴ The organization is divided into various committees that oversee the functioning of the component parts of the system. It has a business committee to oversee the finances, an Islamic studies committee to issue fatwas, and a military committee to organize military campaigns.⁴⁵ Operation Enduring Freedom and our continuing counterterrorism efforts have transformed the organization from what was once more tightly controlled terrorist group into a more amorphous organization.⁴⁶ Al Qaeda supports other terrorist organizations with training and financing while other terror groups are more loosely associated and only obtain ideological support.⁴⁷

Al Qaeda: Ideology and Goals

Osama bin Laden declared Jihad or holy war in February, 1998 fatwa: Jihad against the Crusaders and Jews.

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the word of Almighty Allah, "and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together," and "fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah."⁴⁸

His orders to commit terrorism like the one above are "...couched and justified in language from the Koran."⁴⁹ He uses religion to help motivate his followers but he also uses logic to rationally list the grievances that the West has inflicted upon the Muslim world. In the same fatwa he named the US backing of Israel, the desecration of the holiest places on the Arabian Peninsula, and the killing of Iraqi people as specific reasons to wage jihad.⁵⁰ Terrorism

is a tool of the weak and does not often succeed in achieving its political aims.⁵¹ The state with the preponderance of assets can readily kill terrorist and disrupt their plots. Ideology serves not only to bolster the resolve of the members of the group to suffer through many setbacks but it also allows for the recruitment of new members which is imperative if the organization is to survive. Osama bin Laden provides the goals and ideas for the organization that inspires its members to survive through the hardships and the long odds to continue to fight.⁵²

The al Qaeda movement is an oppressive and extremist version of the Islamic religion. Though bin Laden has not expressed a comprehensive vision of the future for the Muslim world, he has expressed what he believes to be the reasons why the terrorist organization should continue to fight. In this way the leaders of al Qaeda "...recast the numerous local conflicts into a single struggle between an authentic Islam and a host of corrupt satraps who would collapse without the backing of the West—the United States in particular."⁵³ So the ideology of al Qaeda does not give solutions for the problems that face everyday Muslims but it does say who is at fault; the West in general and the United States in particular. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism was correct in surmising that the al Qaeda ideology is indeed "...an ideology of oppression, violence, and hate."⁵⁴

Al Qaeda as a System

Al Qaeda organization could be viewed as a complex system. A system is defined as an assemblage or combination of things or parts forming a complex or unitary whole. Viewing the al Qaeda terrorist organization as a system allows for specific strategies to be developed for each component part of the system. One part of the system may not be easily deterred but other parts might be able to be deterred or reformed. Taking down a node of the system may or may not destroy the organization but it can significantly degrade their ability to effectively operate. For example, the US attacking of the leadership nodes of al Qaeda has significantly affected its ability to conduct large-scale terrorist operations.

There are many ways to separate component parts of a system. Davis and Jenkins segregate the al Qaeda system into leaders, lieutenants, foot soldiers, recruiters, external suppliers and facilitators, heads of states, supportive population segments and the sources of moral and religious support.⁵⁵ This component decomposition of the Al Qaeda system will be essential to developing a workable framework in which deterrence can be effective and will be revisited later in the paper.

Deterrence and Terrorism

Many would say that terrorists can't be deterred. While it is probable that there are numerous terrorists who would refuse to be deterred, this does not mean that all terrorist will refuse. Major General Doron Almog, of the Israel Defense Force, gives an example in which deterrence of terrorism was successful.

In early 2003 an Israeli agent in the Gaza Strip telephoned Mustafa, a wealthy merchant in Gaza, to inform him that over the previous three months his son Ahmad had been preparing for a suicide bombing mission in Israel. Mustafa was told that if his son followed through with his plans, he and his family would suffer severe consequences: their home would be demolished, and Israel would cut off all commercial ties with Mustafa's company. Neither he nor the members of his family would ever be permitted to enter Israel again. Faced with this ultimatum, Mustafa confronted his son and convinced him that the cost to his family would far outweigh any possible benefits his sacrifice might have for the Palestinian people.⁵⁶

This tale shows that deterrence can be effective against terrorist. It also illustrates two key factors that enable the process: intelligence and leverage. In the following section, we will investigate why deterrence often fails with terrorism.

Problems and Pitfalls: Deterrence and Terrorism.

Deterrence has many challenges as a strategy when used to combat terrorism. These numerous challenges can be divided into three major categories. The first category is the physical composition of terrorists, the second category is ideological and motivational composition of terrorists, and the last category deals with the theoretical problems with application of deterrence and terrorism.

The first category is defined by the physical makeup of the terrorists. Terrorists come from many different segments of life. Some are poor and uneducated while others, like Osama bin Laden, are wealthy and well educated. They join the group for many different reasons. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism recognizes that the terrorist networks of today are more dispersed and less centralized. They are more reliant on smaller cells inspired by a common ideology and less directed by a central command structure.⁵⁷ These factors make profiling terrorists difficult. Also, terrorist by necessity are secretive. This makes determining a deterrent strategy very difficult because true motivations may be unknown. The secrecy makes finding leverage difficult at best. Finally, some terrorists, especially those motivated by religion, might not have anything that they care about⁵⁸ except terrorism. If there is no leverage, there's nothing to threaten and therefore there is no deterrence. But these problems does not mean

that deterrence is impossible, it just means that like most strategy it will not be 100% effective and it cannot be stagnant. It must adapt as the terrorists adapt.

The second category is the ideological and motivational composition of terrorists. The first of these mental capabilities of terrorists is that they are highly motivated to produce theatrical displays of violence. Gordon Drake, Warrick Paddon and Daniel Ciechnowski explain that terrorist "...leaders possess no moral compunction against using WMD or causing mass casualties, and both its leaders and followers are religiously and fanatically committed to die for a cause."⁵⁹ Bin Laden might consider himself as an instrument of God and as such would be less inclined to be deterred regardless of the threats. Another reason that the terrorists are motivated to use violence is that it is the only weapon they have to combat the state.⁶⁰

Furthermore, terrorists view terrorism as a way of life. For many who start life in some of the most impoverished parts of the world, terrorism provides a path for advancement, monetary rewards, and international notoriety⁶¹. As Brian Jenkins notes for many in the al Qaeda network:

Violence is their *raison d'être*. The enterprise of terrorism provides status, power, and psychological satisfaction. It attracts new recruits. It demonstrates their devotion and gives them historical importance. Without terrorism, al Qaeda would collapse into just another exotic sect."⁶²

This makes terrorists extremely motivated to continue to conduct acts of terrorism regardless of possible consequences.

Another problem that relates to motivation is that terrorists view this violence as a clash of civilizations⁶³. In Samuel Huntington's well known article "Clash of Civilizations?" he postulated that the future source of conflicts will be based on differences in civilizations and culture⁶⁴. The differences between Western and Islamic cultures are stark where the west is a "...culture of individualism, materialism, change, and competition, whereas many non-Western cultures favor a cultural ethos of collectivism, spirituality-religion, stasis-stability, and sharing."⁶⁵ These cultural and religious differences combined with globalization are causing crisis and conflict. Douglas Johnson and John Martin of the Strategic Issues Institute describe how these cultural differences are contributing to the conflict:

The attacks stem from pervasive fear-in the minds of bin Laden and many other Muslims-that American culture is crushing theirs. In today's geostrategic environment, bin Laden's stated goal of a separate Islamic world leaves him no real choice but to attack the United States with the goal of destroying American influence. The repressive, extremist regime that he seeks to establish is diametrically opposed to the values Americans hold dear and want to see flourish in the world: freedom, democracy, free markets, human rights. If these opposing views of civilization could coexist peacefully, there would perhaps be concern

only at the intersections between them. However, globalization means that no nation can completely exclude itself from the influence of another.⁶⁶

So some terrorists view the conflict as a war of cultural survival. They are acting to protect their way of life and as such are highly motivated to succeed.

Finally, terrorists are highly adaptive.⁶⁷ It is possible that even if a way were found to deter terrorists they would find a way to circumvent the deterrent. For example, a deterrent that was aimed at a terrorist leader if successful might cause that leader to be replaced. This leader could be named a traitor and could risk even death.⁶⁸ For this reason the leader would have little compelling reason to be deterred. Also terrorist leaders like Osama bin Laden have shown little tendencies to compromise. Brian Jenkins notes that for the terrorist leader “compromise equals apostasy, so leaders counseling restraint risk accusation of betrayal. In association with extremists, it is perilous to be less than the most extreme.”⁶⁹ The terrorists’ ideology and motivation combined with limited tools (violence) can make deterrence highly unlikely and difficult. Although the terrorists are highly motivated to commit acts of violence, they have goals and agendas. These goals and agendas may provide the leverage necessary to deter the organization.

The last category of problems deals with how terrorism and deterrence conflict in application. First, the policy of eradication of terrorism and the concept of deterrence appear mutually exclusive. Deterrence basically involves a concept of maintaining or returning to a *quid pro quo*.⁷⁰ In other words, if you don’t do something, I won’t punish you. In the GWOT, the United States made the destruction of the al Qaeda organization and transnational terrorism a goal. So from the terrorist’s point of view there is no motivation to self-deter because regardless of their actions the United States will continue this policy. Basically there is no middle ground in which terrorists can coexist with the United States.

Another problem with eradication is that killing and capturing terrorist leaders may make the deterring the next set of leaders all the more difficult. The National Security Strategy for Combating terrorism recognizes that the loss of leaders may cause the terrorist group to collapse but it also result in “...decentralizing their command structures, making our challenge in neutralizing terrorist leaders even greater.”⁷¹ The loose command and control structure could present a problem for deterrence because these leaders may have little to no direct control of many of its operations. So even if you could deter this new leader, it is possible that he would have little control to actually stop the terrorist attack.

Lastly deterrence as a strategy is “...inherently unreliable...” whose control rest entirely “...upon the voluntary consent of the deterree.”⁷² Since the control of the situation is voluntary

on the part of the terrorist and though he may chose to be deterred today, he may chose not be deterred tomorrow. In trying to prevent the next 9/11, policy makers may not be willing to trust a strategy that relies entirely upon the undependability of deterrence. Also investing in overwhelming military strength to make punishment strategies more apparent is no guarantee that deterrence will be successful. Consider for a moment the case of revolutionary America and Japan in World War II. Both of these conflicts were started by the weaker opponent. Al Qaeda in its attacks on the United States in 911 would appear "...to be a case of the flea attacking the flesh of the elephant..."⁷³ While it is probable that the leaders of al Qaeda did not realize the ferocity the response to 911, it is possible that regardless of our overwhelming strength, its leaders will refuse to be deterred from mass casualty terrorism. But just because you cannot deter the leaders of the organization, does not mean that you can't deter portions of the terrorist system.

Expanding Deterrence in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism

It is important to understand how the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism employs deterrence. The strategy explicitly recognizes that terrorists must be denied the ability to use WMD,⁷⁴ denied the support from rogue states,⁷⁵ and that their networks can be deterred.⁷⁶ These are all vital aspects for the use of deterrence in combating terrorism but deterrence can do more. The strategy fails to fully develop the idea of the terrorist network and how deterrence can be used effectively against each node of the network. The strategy rejects the use of deterrence on the "hard core"⁷⁷ terrorists. Though it might be very difficult to deter these terrorist, it is not impossible. Even hard core terrorists have objectives and by threatening those objectives you can gain leverage which can lead to deterrence. The strategy states that it "...will work to halt the influx of recruits into terrorist organizations"⁷⁸ but deterrence is not mentioned as a strategy that could produce this effect. The strategy recognizes that disrupting the source of funds to terrorists is important in starving the network⁷⁹ and later notes that some institutions are accomplices with the terrorists⁸⁰ but again it does not leverage deterrence to achieve this outcome.

In general the strategy overly relies on the concept of effective democracy as a panacea to combat terrorism.⁸¹ In application, the strategy over utilized the military option of preemption. It has been argued earlier in this paper the importance of reputation on deterrence and that military preemption has bolstered our deterrence. But the overextension of our military forces in Iraq may have an opposite effect. Rogue nations view our military operations in Iraq and might come to the conclusion that we are fully committed. They could then conclude that the United

States does not have additional forces necessary to counter any wrongdoings that they commit. This conclusion, whether right or wrong, could lead to a failure of deterrence. Recent saber rattling by North Korea and Iran on their respective nuclear dilemmas is a possible example of this.

Of course, the United States needs a comprehensive strategy that links threats and defense, information operations, and carrots and sticks. Each “tactic” in this overall strategy would be tailored to the part of the al Qaeda system that is most likely to produce results. For example, using Davis and Jenkins systematic decomposition of the al Qaeda organization, a series of questions are posed. Is the component deterrable? What happens should deterrence fail? These answers form a Deterrence matrix that is useful in developing specific strategies in the GWOT. See Table 1.

System Component	Deterrable?	Type.	Best Strategy should deterrence fail.
Leaders and Lieutenants	Yes ¹	General Denial	Kill or Capture ²
Foot Soldiers and Recruiters	Yes ³	Immediate General Punishment	Kill or Capture ²
External Suppliers/Facillators	Yes	General Punishment	Seize assets/imprisonment
Supportive Heads of States	Yes	Immediate General Punishment	Pre-emption
Supportive Population	Yes ⁴	General Punishment	Inducements and Education
Sources of Moral/Religious Support	Yes ⁴	General Punishment	Inducements and Education

Notes: 1. Leaders may be deterred but prospects are slight. The strategy should be attempted but is not likely to succeed. 2. Strategy includes law enforcement and military means to kill and capture terrorist and their supporters. 3. Threats against what these people hold dear could be successful. 4. Threats of violence might be successful but could be counterproductive. Inducement strategies should be attempted first and deterrence should be used if inducements fail.

TABLE 1. AL QAEDA Deterrence Matrix

Terrorist leaders may not be deterred from acts of violence for numerous reasons. These hard core leaders need to be captured or killed. Denial, defense, and consequence

management strategies are the most likely to succeed. Against foot soldiers and recruiters, threats of punishment against what they hold most dear is likely to be effective. Heads of state and external suppliers of support have much more assets and therefore more leverage for a deterrent strategy. Threats of punishment on supportive populations and sources of religious and moral support may be possible but this action is likely to ostracize a larger part of the population and is therefore counterproductive. Therefore, positive inducements and education are much more likely to achieve the desired results.

In the war of ideas, deterrence may allow us to combat terrorism more effectively because it prevents collateral damage and shows restraint thereby increasing legitimacy in the eyes of the populace. It is held that winning the war of ideas is just as important as winning the kinetic war. Stephen Biddle of the Strategic Studies Institute believes the war should include a "...synergistic interaction between violence to root out terrorists and persuasion to prevent their replacement from among the great mass of politically uncommitted Muslims."⁸² The US must counter the ideology and themes that al Qaeda offers to limit the influx of new recruits and separate the group from its popular support base. Important themes that the US needs to communicate in this war of ideas include:

- The US will not be deterred by terrorism. We will relentlessly hunt down terrorists and bring them to justice.⁸³
- Terrorism is not an effective tool against the US. We will respond very harshly to terrorist attacks.⁸⁴
- We will not give into terrorist demands.⁸⁵
- The US will not close our boarder or become isolationist.⁸⁶
- The US is not at war with Islam. Terrorists are the enemy.
- The US is concerned with the problems that the greater Muslim population faces.

Winning the battle of ideas needs to be backed up by observable action. It is one thing to say that the United States and its allies are strong and resolute, it is quite another to show it. A successful war in Iraq and Afghanistan improve the deterrent effect and will go a long way in converting the opinion that the United States is bin Laden's "weak horse" to an opinion that it is a "strong horse".

The third part of the strategy is an effective positive inducement program or the carrot. This strategy should weave together the diplomatic and economic elements of national power. Much of the Muslim world is troubled with real problems that need real solutions. Difficult government and economic changes in the Middle East are required to solve these problems. The United States needs a comprehensive inducement program to minimize poverty, racism,

and oppression. The United States needs to take the diplomatic lead to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If the United States could remain impartial and solve this problem, much wind would be removed from the sails of terrorism and it would allow other regional governments to come aboard as allies in the GWOT.⁸⁷

These issues need to be addressed without it appearing that the US is kowtowing to the terrorist demands. There are ways to circumvent this problem. One way is to perform these actions in phases. First you defeat the terrorists then you bring in positive inducements.⁸⁸ Another possibility is to link positive inducements with positive actions in the GWOT. When a group or community behaves in a way that helps the GWOT (e.g. turning in suspected terrorists, quelling local violence, etc.) a positive inducement occurs (money for infrastructure, jobs programs, education, etc.).

The last leg of the strategy is pre-emption or “the stick”. This strategy when judiciously applied will enhance the overall strategy. Pre-emption should be used when there is clear evidence that a state is supporting terrorism and other means including diplomatic discussions and economic sanctions have failed to produce the desired results. Pre-emption will enhance our ability to deter future regimes from supporting terrorist groups.⁸⁹ As an example, it is probably that Mohammed Kaddafi’s decision to give up his WMD efforts was made in part from the lesson that Afghanistan and Iraq provide.⁹⁰

Conclusion

The war on terrorism will not be won by the military. It is possible that the military could lose the GWOT by over prosecution of the war and relying too much on the kinetic aspects of war and thereby alienating the Muslim population. The military will be a key component in the GWOT but like the Cold War, the winner will be the one whose ideas and will are the strongest. This war will require leaders to develop and implement a comprehensive strategy that weaves together all aspects of national power. The military response to the war on terror is just one aspect of this war but it cannot “...address the root conditions that spawn it”⁹¹ and therefore cannot win it.

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism affirms that the long-term approach to winning the GWOT is through advancing democracy. Effective democracies fight oppression and racism. They establish the conditions where education and economic growth can flourish to reduce poverty. Democracies have fair judicial systems that control crimes. They resolve conflict peacefully. Effective democracies “...are the long-term antidote to the ideology of terrorism today.”⁹² It is in the United States’ interest to work with Pro-American state leaders in

the area that are not democratic to encourage an "...open discussion, tolerance, and politically effective compromise rather than violence."⁹³

As Patrick Morgan aptly describes deterrence is "...inherently imperfect. It does not consistently work and we cannot manipulate it sufficiently to fix that and make it a completely reliable tool of statecraft."⁹⁴ In that, deterrence is much like strategy in general. No strategy is foolproof and we must come to the conclusion that from time to time deterrence will fail. During those times, it is important to show resolve and make the aggressors pay the price and revitalize our reputation.⁹⁵ Application of deterrence to specific situations and enemy is highly unpredictable.⁹⁶ Deterrence can provide some solutions but alone it is unlikely to succeed because it is a "...mere tactic..."⁹⁷ in the GWOT. But when woven together with the strategies of inducement, pre-emption, and the War of Ideas, it provides a broad strategy in which deterrence both bolsters and is bolstered by the other elements of the strategy. This strategy is much more likely to succeed.

In the War on Terror, the United States has once again found itself in a struggle of ideologies. Instead of the totalitarianism of the Soviets, we face the totalitarianism of the transnational terrorist. In some aspects this war is easier than the cold one because the opponent has so little real strength. But in many ways the opponent has an "asymmetric motivational advantage,"⁹⁸ which might counter any military or economic advantage that the United States and its allies enjoy. To win this war, the United States and its allies must recognize that they are in a battle of wills and "...only weakness of will can normally keep the state from prevailing."⁹⁹

Endnotes

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